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CHAPTER 8
EMPLOYMENT, 
UNEMPLOYMENT, AND 
UNDEREMPLOYMENT IN 
AFRICA
STEPHEN GOLUB AND FARAZ HAYAT
8.1 Introduction
Generation of “good” jobs and economic development are closely connected. Rising labor 
incomes are the primary means through which growth is translated into improved standards 
of living and lower poverty rates. Moreover, employment in “modern” sectors involving skill 
development and technological learning in turn can promote productivity growth, economic 
development, and demographic transitions with lower birth rates. The last 50 years have wit­
nessed a virtuous cycle of rapid growth of export-led labor-intensive manufacturing, growth of 
employment, slowing population growth, and rising wages and living standards in a number 
of emerging countries, particularly in East Asia (e.g. Pack 1988; Radelet, Sachs, and Lee 1997; 
World Bank 1993), as labor has been absorbed into modern industry out of subsistence agricul­
ture and urban informal activities. The most dramatic recent example is of course China, where 
75 million private sector jobs have been created since China’s opening to the global economy, 
resulting in the largest poverty reduction program in world history (World Bank 2013:58).
What about Africa? Much has been made of the emerging “Cheetah” economies of Africa 
(e.g. The Economist 2011; Radelet 2010) and indeed African growth has picked up substan­
tially since the mid-1990s in many countries and on the continent as a whole. Important 
strides have been made in health and education indicators. But, relative to other parts of the 
developing world and in absolute terms, African growth in per capita GDP has been limited 
and poverty reduction has been disappointing.
African employment consequently remains overwhelmingly informal. This chapter 
documents and analyzes the predominance of informal employment and argues that lack 
of demand for labor is the main problem. Integration into the global economy and exports 
of labor-intensive products are vital to boosting the demand for labor in Africa. Africa has
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some potential to become competitive in light manufacturing, but the most promising ave­
nue for export-led growth in many African countries is agriculture, including traditional 
cash crops such as cotton, coffee, cocoa, and groundnuts. Contrary to common percep­
tions, traditional cash crops, which are the source of livelihood for millions of Africans, have 
many of the features of manufacturing exports: high labor-intensity, potential for quality 
improvements through technological transfer, and lucrative but quality-sensitive markets in 
developed countries. The same obstacles inhibit traditional and non-traditional agricultural 
exports as manufacturing: inhospitable business climates characterized by corruption, high 
transactions costs, and deficient infrastructure. Section 2 presents the basic facts of perva­
sive under-employment and dualistic labor markets, section 3 makes the case that underem­
ployment results primarily from lack of demand rather than worker characteristics, section 
4 reviews relevant theoretical models, section 5 discusses policies for boosting employment 
and incomes through export-led growth, and section 6 concludes.
8.2 Patterns of Employment, Unemployment, 
AND Underemployment in African 
Labor Markets
8.2.1 Employment and unemployment patterns
Data on employment in Africa are sparse and not very up to date. The very concepts of labor 
force participation, employment, and unemployment used in developed economies are 
problematic in low-income Africa (Fox and Pimhidzai 2013; Fields 2012). Nevertheless, the 
available information paints a consistent pattern: African labor markets are marked by sharp 
dualism with very small formal employment. Agriculture and urban informal sectors' fea­
ture pervasive underemployment rather than open unemployment. Labor force participa­
tion rates in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are not dramatically different from other developing 
regions. The historically unique aspect of African labor markets is the extent of informality 
(Roubaud and Torelli 2013).
Table 8.1 shows the distribution of employment into government, formal private sector, 
and informal sector for selected countries, based on labor market surveys, around 2006. 
Informal employment is defined here as agricultural work, non-wage-employment, and 
part-time wage employment. For SSA low-income countries, informal employment defined 
in this way accounts for at least 80 percent of total employment, and often 90-95 percent.^ 
In half of the low-income SSA countries in Table 8.1, government employment exceeds for­
mal private sector employment. In all these countries, however, both formal private and
' As Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) note, definitions of the informal sector differ, with various studies 
using alternative criteria. The overwhelming share of informal employment, however, is not likely to be 
sensitive to the chosen definition.
' Informal employment in Table 8.1 is slightly higher than wage employment in Fox et al. (2013) 
because informal employment includes some part-time and informal wage employment. See also Note 3.
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Table 8.1 Distribution of employment by sector, selected African countries
Sub-Sahara low-income
Benin
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Congo Rep.
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zambia
Sub-Sahara mic
Botswana 
South Africa 
North Africa 
Egypt
Year of 
survey
Public sector 
including state- 
owned enterprises
Formal
private sector
Informal
sector
i e
2005 2.6% 2.1% 95.30/0
2005 4.3% 1.0% 94.70/0
2005 4.9% 4.7% 90.4%
2005 6.3% 1.8% 91.9%
2005 3.9% 6.20/0 89.90/0
2010 6.4% 7.0% 86.6%
2005 NA NA 86.5%
2004 9.0% 11.50/0 79.5%
2007 3.1% O.40/0 96.5%
2004 8.0% 0.3Wo 91.80/0
2006 3.7% 1.2% 95.1%
2001 1.8% 6.10/0 92.1%
2006 3.0% I.50A) 95.5%
2006 2.8% 14.2% 83.0%
2005 5.2% 6.8% 88.0%
■income
2006 25.00/0 37.0% 38.00A)
2007 16.0% 45.60/0 38.4%
2005 30.0<Vo io.o<yo 61.00yb
Sources-Benin, Burkina Faso, Senegal: Benjamin and Mbaye (2012); Ethiopia, Mali, Malawi, Madagascar, 
Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria:Stampini etal.(2013); Botswana: Van Klaveren et al. 
(2009a); Egypt: As'ad (2009); Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo; Razafindrakoto et al. 12009J, 
Zambia'van Klaveren etal. (2009b);Ghana; Data Portal Ghana (2010).
government employment are under 10 percent, and often below 5 percent of the labor force. 
Informal employment in middle-income SSA economies Botswana and South Africa is 
lower, although still sizeable at 38 percent in both cases. Egypt, typical of North Africa, is 
an intermediate case, with 61 percent informal employment, with the bulk of the remainder
employed in the public sector (30 percent).
In a study of the urban informal sectors of ten francophone countries, Roubaud and 
Torelli (2013) confirm the dominance of informal employment even in the capital cities, 
finding that on average 77 percent of these cities’ labor forces is informally employed^ 
Fox et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive analysis of African employment patterns, and 
find very low levels of wage employment in 2005, typically about 10-15 percent of the
labor force.
3 Informal employment in Roubaud and Torelli (2013) includes some workers employed m the 
formal sector but there is a high correlation between informal employment and workers m the inform 
sector-97 percent of informal sector jobs are informal while informal employment accounts for 
41 percent of the much smaller number of jobs in the formal private sector.
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Open unemployment rates are generally very low in low-income SSA, often well below 
the levels in developed economies, for example, 0.7 percent in Benin, 2 percent in Uganda, 
2.3 percent in Burkina Faso, and 2.6 percent in Madagascar. Unemployment is higher in 
middle-income SSA countries, particularly South Africa (Kingdon and Knight 2004). 
Also, unlike developed countries, in Africa recorded unemployment rates rise with the 
level of education, and university graduates tend to have the highest levels of unemploy­
ment (African Development Bank 2012). Unemployment is simply not an option for the 
poor and unskilled, who find refuge in subsistence agriculture and the urban informal 
sector (Fields 2012). The quality of the unemployment data is open to question, with 
unemployment and exit from the labor force difficult to distinguish. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that Africa has an employment rather than an unemployment problem (Fields 2012).
Following independence, almost all African countries adopted highly interventionist 
import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policies characterized by growth of the pub­
lic sector and protection of domestic industries. Widespread economic crises in the 1980s 
led to structural adjustment policies involving contraction of the public sector and reduced 
protection of formal import-competing industries. Public employment declined in abso­
lute terms, and even more so as a share of the labor force, between the late 1970s and the 
mid-1990s (Goldsmith 1999). Structural adjustment programs initially also entailed declines 
in private sector industrial employment as inefficient import-substituting industries col­
lapsed and non-traditional export growth was disappointing. Since about 1995. African 
growth has picked up, resulting in rising formal employment, but from a low base (African
Development Bank 2012; Fox and Gaal 2008).
Growth of wage employment has been insufficient to make much of a dent in underemploy­
ment (Kingdon, Sandefur, and Teal 2006; Haywood and Teal 2009; Fox and Gaal 2008; Fox et al. 
2013). Private sector wage employment grew too slowly to offset decUning pubUc sector employ­
ment, or even to keep up with labor force growth in some countries. In recent years, self- and 
family- (largely urban) employment rose sharply as a share of the labor force. In Zambia, for 
example, wage employment decUned from 25 percent of the labor force in the 1970s to less than 
10 percent in 2005 (Fox and Gaal 2008). Wage employment is much lower for women than men.
8.2.2 Earnings: dualism and underemployment
Remuneration differs sharply between the formal and informal sectors in African econo­
mies. Table 8.2 shows that dualism is much greater in low-income Africa than other 
developing countries, comparing gross domestic product (GDP) per capitate wages and pro­
ductivity in manufacturing, for selected countries, based on data availability.'* Productivity 
and wages in manufacturing are measured as annual value added and labor compensation 
per employee, respectively, using United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) data.’ Manufacturing productivity and wages are very high relative to per capita
4 Countries use varying definitions of these concepts, and the findings in Table 8.2 should be viewed 
as general tendencies rather than precise estimates. Also, the formal manufacturing sector is very small 
in most African low-income countries. See Mbaye and Golub (2002) and Golub and Edwards (2004) for
more discussion of international comparisons of labor costs and productivity.
5 UNIDO labor compensation data do not include employer contributions to social insurance hinds 
and fringe benefits. UNIDO statistics cover only formal firms.
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Table 8.2 Indicatorsof labor costs,^selected regions and countries
Manufacturing wage/
it.’ Manufacturing manufacturing Minimum
wage/GDP per capita productivity wage/GDP per capita
Low-income sub-Saharan Africa
Cameroon 5.0 0.34
Ethiopia 6.1 0.20
Ghana 4.9 0.18 0.43
Kenya 4.7 0.31 1.93
Lesotho 2.5 NA 1.31
Malawi 3.3 0.31 1.14
Senegal 9,4 0.35 1.05
Tanzania 4.5 0.23 4.36
Uganda 8.6 0.09 0.44
Middle-income sub-Saharan Africa
Mauritius 1.0 0.43 0.17
South Africa 2.5 0.38 0.29
North Africa
Egypt 1.8 0.26 0.41
Morocco 2.6 0.42 1.18
Tunisia 1.7 0.41 0.58
East Asia
Cambodia 2.9 0.33 0.77
China 1.1 0.16 0.51
Indonesia 1.1 0.15 0.54
Korea 1A 0.22 0.49
Malaysia 1.1 0.32 0.34
Thailand 0.7 0.18 0.54
Viet Nam 2.0 0.28 0.68
South Asia
India 2.4 0.19 0.68
Nepal 1.8 0.19 1.21
Latin America
Mexico 0.7 0.24 0.15
Source: UNIDO industrial Statistics Database, World Bank World Development Indicators, US State 
Department, and authors' calculations,
^ Manufacturing data around 2005, minimum wages in 2012.
GDP in low-income African countries. The ratio of manufacturing wages to per capita GDP 
is often about 5 or higher in these countries, and above 2 in all cases. In middle-income SSA 
countries and North Africa, the differentials are much smaller, especially in Mauritius. In 
Asia, particularly East Asia, the ratio of manufacturing wages to per capita GDP is usually 
not far from parity. In Mexico the ratio is actually below 1. Gelb, Meyer, and Ramachandran 
(2013) and Clarke (2011) also find that African manufacturing wages are very high relative to 
per capita GDP, using firm-level data.
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Roubaud and Torelli (2013) provide further evidence of dualism. They find that earnings 
are generally much higher in the formal public and private sectors than in the informal sec­
tor, resulting in extremely high Gini coefficients for labor income. Pubhc enterprise and to 
a lesser extent general government earnings are particularly high, well above formal private 
sector earnings, which in turn are typically double to triple informal sector earnings. The 
gap between formal and informal earnings is even more pronounced for women than men. 
Moreover, job tenure is quite long in the formal sector and even in the informal sectors, 
indicating limited mobility between sectors. Formal sector jobs are primarily held by older 
workers, which, together with the evidence of limited formal job creation previously noted, 
suggests that the prospects for young people are even dimmer than the overall statistics sug­
gest (African Development Bank 2012). In addition, Roubaud and Torelli note that the infor­
mal sector itself is segmented, as also stressed by Benjamin and Mbaye (2012).
Roubaud and Torelli (2013) also document the pervasiveness of urban underemployment, 
which they divide into “time-related” underemployment where workers are involuntarily 
working part-time, and “invisible” unemployment, defined as those workers who earn less 
than the minimum wage. In addition, the vast majority of the workforce in SSA does not 
receive any social security or other fringe benefits.
The unsatisfactory nature of African employment opportunities is manifested in work­
ers’ answers to questions about their aspirations. More than half of young workers (aged 
15-24 years) surveyed aspire to formal employment in pubhc or private sectors (Roubaud 
and Torelli 2013), despite the paucity of formal job creation. The African Development Bank 
(2012), using Gallop poll data, provides similar evidence of mismatch between aspirations of 
young people and the reahties of the job market.
In summary, since the era of structural adjustment, employment opportunities in the pub­
lic sector have dwindled and the formal private sector has failed to grow sufficiently to absorb 
the large majority of the working population in agriculture and the urban informal sector, 
earning very low incomes and lacking access to social insurance programs. Lewis (1954) 
noted that much of Africa did not fully fit his model of unlimited supply of labor in subsist­
ence activities. However, due to rapid population growth combined with limited develop­
ment of the formal sector, Lewis’s framework now fits very well for much of low-income 
Africa, dominated by subsistence agriculture and small-scale informal family firms:
What we have is not one island of expanding capitalist employment surrounded by a vast sea 
of subsistence workers, but rather a number of such tiny islands... We find a few industries 
highly capitalized such as mining or electric power side by side with most primitive tech­
niques, a few high class shops surrounded by masses of old style traders, a few highly capital­
ized plantations, surrounded by a sea of peasants, (p. 147)
8.3 Causes of Dualism and 
Underemployment in Africa
There are two main explanations for the large differentials in earnings and pervasive under­
employment described above; (i) heterogeneous labor, with the preponderance of the labor 
force having low human capital and limited skills, and (ii) low demand for labor combined
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with labor market segmentation. The labor heterogeneity argument claims that differences 
in human capital and other worker characteristics explain income differentials. The seg­
mentation argument shifts the focus to the product markets with a shortage of “good” jobs, 
and rationing of these jobs. It is important to ascertain which of these two explanations is 
relatively more important in Africa, although of course both likely have some validity. If 
higher wages depend on raising human capital then the focus of poverty-reduction strate­
gies on education and health in Africa is appropriate. If, however, low demand for labor 
originates in the product market, improved educational attainments and health outcomes 
may not be sufficient to boost formal employment, and the focus instead should be on the 
business climate.
The observed patterns of wages and employment suggest that low demand for labor is 
the primary cause. In general, education explains only about 30 percent of variations in 
labor compensation (Mortensen 2005). Although this may reflect unobservable labor skills 
(Rosenzweig 1988), Mortensen (2005) finds that labor heterogeneity is robust to inclusion of 
numerous controls. Teal (2011) cites recent evidence showing that segmentation is common 
in African labor markets, particularly between firms of different sizes. Soderbaum, Teal, and 
Wambugu (2002) show that when observable and unobservable aspects of human capital are 
controlled for, wages are much higher in larger firms. Kingdon, Sandefur, and Teal (2006) 
conclude that non-competitive theories such as efficiency wages and bargaining models 
explain this effect better than human capital theory. In the formal manufacturing sector. Fox 
and Oviedo (2008) show that wage premiums do not reflect productivity differences.
Enterprise surveys and poll data provide further evidence that low demand for labor 
rather than lack of education is the most binding constraint. Respondents to enterprise 
surveys in Africa tend not to rate lack of education of the labor force as one of the top 
constraints. The African Development Bank (2012) used Gallop Poll Surveys conducted 
in ten North African countries (African Development Bank 2012), finding that factors 
relating to insufficient labor demand (lack of jobs, insufficient government efforts, weak 
economy, jobs being given to people with connections, and corruption) together account 
for about two-thirds of the reasons provided. Secondary and tertiary education improves 
the chances of having wage employment, but even for workers with university education, 
under-employment and unemployment is the norm. The African Development Bank 
(2012) reports that only 30 percent of young people with some tertiary education hold 
wage employment, another 30 percent are in “vulnerable employment”, and the remaining 
40 percent are unemployed, inactive or discouraged. Open unemployment actually rises 
with education, as previously noted.
Several other factors contribute to low formal employment, (i) Education maybe expand­
ing, but fail to impart useful skills (Page 2012; African Development Bank 2012), creating a 
mismatch between worker skills and employer needs, (ii) Rapid population growth exac­
erbates the excess supply of labor in Africa (Fox et al. 2013), offsetting the effects of output 
growth. To some extent, however, Africa’s failure to experience a demographic transition 
reflects the lack of structural transformation so cause and effect are difficult to distinguish. 
Third, wages could be driven up by “Dutch Disease” effects in some natural-resource abun­
dant countries, but this cannot explain why informal sector labor incomes are so low relative 
to formal-sector wages. Moreover, natural resource abundance does not necessarily pre­
clude labor-intensive manufacturing exports, as Malaysia and Indonesia have shown (Fox 
et al. 2013).
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8.4 Models of Dualism and Underemployment
8.4.1 Dualism and structural transformation: 
the Lewis model
The Lewis (1954) model still provides the starting point for understanding African dualism 
as resulting from low demand for labor in the modern sector. The model features a large 
traditional sector with subsistence incomes and a small modern sector paying much highe 
wages. The process of economic development involves expansion of the modern (formal) 
sector through capital accumulation, gradually absorbing surplus labor from the subsistence
^^^Figure L depicts the intersectoral allocation of labor in the Lewis model between rural 
(r) and modern (m) sectors^ L represents the total labor force, MPL is the marginal pro­
ductivity of labor, and W the real wage. Due to a “surplus” of labor, MPL, is very low, with 
the modern sector consequently facing a perfectly elastic supply of labor For reasons^ 
specified in Lewis (1954), however, is set exogenously well above the subsistence level W,
Initially, as the modern sector invests, raising MPL„, its employment expands, for ex^ple, 
from L, to L„ absorbing labor from the traditional sector without raising W,, Eventually, the 
absorption of labor in the modern sector reaches L,, the Lewis turning point, and incomes
begin to rise above subsistence levels in the traditional sector. . / u
Ihe modern sector’s output maybe modeled using the a Cobb-Douglas fiinction (sub­
script m suppressed), Q = F(A,K,L) = AK“L'-“, where A is technology, Kis capital, and! is
labor. Labor market equilibrium implies
Denoting i = and likewise for other variables, it is easy to show that:
L =
A + aK-W 
a
That is, the rate of growth of modern-sector employment depends on technological pro 
gress, capital accumulation, and real wage moderation.
8.4.2 Urban unemploynieiit and informal employment
Harris and Todaro (1970) (HT) elaborated on Lewis’s dualistic labor market to include 
large-scale urban unemployment and underemployment, making migration endog­
enous. Surplus rural labor migrates to the higher-paid urban (modern) sector as long as 
the expected urban wage is higher than the rural wage. Equilibrium occurs when expected 
wages are equalized through adjustments in unemployment. That is, rural-urban migration
* Figures 8.1 and 8.2 are based on Basu (1997)- 
that wages equal the marginal productivity of lab
This version diverges from Lewis (1954) in assuming 
or in the traditional sector, rather than average product.
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The Lewis model of labor market dualism
FIGURE 8.1 The Lewis model of labor market dualism.
continues until unemployment rises such that the probability of a finding a high-paying job 
falls enough to equalize expected urban and rural wages.
Figure 8.2 depicts the HT model. HH represents a rectangular hyperbola on which the 
rural equilibrium wage and employment level lie, for a given modern sector wage and 
employment level. Equilibrium maybe stated as:
where L — L^ is the urban labor force and
Lm
L-lr
is the probability of finding a j ob in the modern
sector.
Fields (1975,1990) presented a further important extension of the HT model, distinguish­
ing unemployment and informal employment. The economy’s labor force is now composed 
of four groups: workers in the urban modern sector; workers in the urban informal sector; 
the urban unemployed; and subsistence agriculture. In Fields’ model, taking a low-paying 
urban informal job facilitates searching for a modern-sector job relative to remaining in 
the countryside, although unemployed workers face even lower search costs. Fields’ (1975) 
framework implies that urban informal earnings are below rural incomes, although supe­
rior to incomes of the unemployed. In reality, urban informal incomes are higher than in 
agriculture (Fox and Gaal 2008), but real incomes of the urban informal sector could still be 
lower, considering the higher pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of urban living relative to 
village life.
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The Harris-Todaro Model
FIGURE 8.2 The Harris-Todaro model.
Both the Lewis and HT models assume but do not explain the reasons for high and sticky 
modern sector wages. These high wages could be due to minimum wages, unions, or effi­
ciency wage considerations. The labor turnover model (Stiglitz 1974) proposes that firms pay 
higher wages to reduce quit rates. Alternatively, the biological efficiency wage model (Stiglitz 
1976) assumes that firms pay higher wages so that workers have enough nutrition to work 
productively and avoid illness.
The HT model and Fields extension show how surplus labor is manifested in open unem­
ployment and urban informal employment, in addition to subsistence agriculture. The 
central underlying problem giving rise to dualism, however, remains the scarcity of relatively 
high-paying modern sector jobs, as stressed by Lewis (i954)-
8.4.3 roles of globalization and modernization 
of the informal sector
Two important extensions to the Lewis perspective are relevant to contemporary 
Africa: (i) the role of globalization in accelerating structural transformation, and (ii) mod­
ernization of informal practices, especially in agriculture, through technology transfer.
8.4.3.1 Globalization
In the original Lewis (1954) model, the speed of economic development depends on domes­
tic capital investment and technological change in the modern sector. Fei and Ranis (1964)
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and others extended the Lewis model by refining the intersectoral linkages and the role of 
agriculture, while still assuming a closed economy. Contemporary globalization requires 
some important amendments through two channels: (i) Foreign capital, particularly for­
eign direct investment (FDI), provides an alternative to domestic savings and technological 
change. Moreover, FDI provides higher-paying jobs, increased competition, more training, 
and knowledge spillovers (Javorcik 2012). (ii) Outsourcing of labor-intensive manufactured 
products such as apparel by global supply chains (e.g. Gereffi 1999) also raises the demand 
for labor in developing countries. Murphy et al. (1989) is in the spirit of Lewis (1954), allow­
ing for exports but with costly access to foreign markets. Thus, the central problem becomes 
alleviating bottlenecks to labor-intensive exports. Golub, Jones, and Kierzkowki (2007) 
point to the importance of domestic “service links”, that is, infrastructure and public ser­
vices, in enabling developing countries to participate in the international fragmentation 
of production. Viewed from this perspective, accelerating growth of the modern sector 
requires improvement of the business climate in order to attract FDI and other “footloose” 
inputs that are critical to global competitiveness in manufacturing.
8.4.3.2 Modernization of the urban informal sector and agriculture
Lewis (1954) focused on shifting out modern sector labor demand but another possibility 
is to raise productivity in agriculture and the informal sector, shifting the demand for labor 
in the rural sector. Lewis recognized that the distinction between traditional and modern 
activities did not coincide with rural and urban, as shown by the quote above. Much atten­
tion now focuses on raising productivity of the urban informal sector (e.g. Fox and Sohnesen 
2012) but agriculture may be more promising. The products of the urban informal sector are 
predominantly non-tradable services or artisanal manufacturing, with minimal exporting. 
Exports of traditional and non-traditional agricultural cash crops, on the other hand, are a 
viable African alternative to manufacturing for labor-intensive export-led growth (Golub, 
O’Connell, and Du 2008; Brenton, Newfarmer, and Walkenhorst 2009). This issue is dis­
cussed in more detail in the next section.
8.5 Expanding Employment 
THROUGH Labor-intensive 
Non-traditional Exports in Africa
Export-led growth is often identified with manufacturing, based on East Asia’s and to a lesser 
extent Latin America’s successes. Collier (2008) is pessimistic about Africa’s ability to com­
pete with Asian manufacturers, given their head start and competitive advantages. Dinh 
et al. (2012) argue that Africa can compete in some light manufacturing industries, but that 
weaknesses in the business climate must be remedied.
Alternates to manufacturing for labor-intensive exports are available. Africa has promis­
ing export industries in tourism, fishing and especially agriculture, including horticulture 
(fruits, vegetables, and cut flowers) and perhaps most significantly, traditional cash crops.
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Agricultural exports share many of the features of manufacturing, both in terms of their 
potential to spur growth and employment, and the institutional constraints they face in 
achieving this potential. Several critical aspects of manufacturing exports promoting devel­
opment and poverty reduction apply to traditional and non-traditional agriculture: (i) high 
labor-intensity, (ii) possibilities for technological upgrading and consequently raising pro­
ducer incomes, (iii) access to state-of-the-art foreign technology through FDI and outsour­
cing, and (iv) the necessity of attaining international competitiveness, and thus (v) the 
critical roles of low-cost labor and a favorable climate for investment. For agriculture, espe­
cially, sanitary and phyto-sanitary norms in developed country markets are a major hurdle 
for successful exporting (Golub and McManus 2008) analogous to the demanding specifica­
tions of global buyers of apparel.
The augmented Lewis model in section 4 suggests two main institutional impediments to 
labor-intensive exports (i) wages are set too high in the modern sector, and (ii) the adverse 
business climate deters investment and technological upgrading in labor-intensive tradable 
industries, both in manufacturing and agriculture.
8.5.1 High labor costs
Minimum wages, unions, and labor market restrictions can raise urban labor costs, reducing 
employment in the formal sector as firms adopt more capital-intensive techniques or exit the 
country (equation 1 in section 4.1). As shown in section 2.2, manufacturing wages in Africa 
are very high relative to per capita income and informal sector incomes. This is partly due 
to relatively high minimum wages and labor market restrictions. Table 8.2 shows that mini­
mum wages relative to GDP are much higher in most low-income African countries than 
in other regions, particularly East Asia. This is not the case for the middle-income African 
countries, although South Africa has rather high manufacturing wages, likely due in part to 
strong unions rather than minimum wages. Minimum wages may therefore be part of the 
explanation for high manufacturing wages relative to GDP in low-income African countries.
Some studies (e.g. Rama 2000; Fox and Oviedo 2013) have found that minimum wages 
and labor market restrictions are not a major constraint in Africa, unlike in other regions, 
despite often highly restrictive statutory provisions, perhaps because of lack of enforcement 
or because other constraints are more important. This benign perspective on labor market 
regulations may be overstated, for several reasons. First, labor market conflicts may be of 
lesser importance than infrastructure or corruption, but could still matter. Second, domestic 
firms, particularly in the informal sector, may be able to routinely disregard labor market 
statutes. Formal firms, especially foreign investors, however, may feel compelled to abide by 
local laws, due to lesser recourse to authority in the host country as well as pressures from 
labor-rights activists at home, and thus may simply eschew investing in countries with such 
laws even if they are not much enforced.
Both wages and productivity in manufacturing are high in Africa relative to per capita 
GDP. Unit labor costs, the ratio of wages to productivity, also tend to be higher in Africa 
than in other developing regions, adversely affecting international competitiveness (Mbaye 
and Golub 2002; Edwards and Golub 2004; Clarke 2011; Gelb, Meyer and Ramachandran 
2013). One possible way of improving competitiveness, adopted in East Asia, is to promote
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exchange-rate undervaluation, but this is precluded in countries in monetary unions, as in 
francophone West and Central Africa.
8.5.2 Business climate for investment
More importantly than labor market restrictions, the African business climate remains very 
problematic in some areas, notably poor infrastructure and public services and burden­
some restrictions and regulations (Ramachandran, Gelb, and Shah 2009; Eifert, Gelb, and 
Ramachandran 2008). Deficiencies in infrastructure, red tape and corruption raise indirect 
costs of production, input sourcing, and distribution substantially. Low-income African 
countries mostly rank at the bottom of standard measures of competitiveness and the busi­
ness climate, such as the World Bank’s Doing Business indexes.
As Lin and Monga (2010), Rodrik (2008), Golub, Berrnhardt, and Liu (2011), UNCTAD 
(2010), and others have stressed the private sector is the engine of job creation, but economic 
development requires a “developmental state” that assists the private sector to overcome 
market failures, such as external economies of scale, coordination failures, and knowledge 
externalities. Yet in African countries state failures are often even worse than market failures. 
These state failures take the form of both errors of omission (failure to invest in infrastruc­
ture and provide public services) and commission (excessive regulation and predation on 
private businesses) (Krueger 1990).
These institutional dysfunctions raise transactions costs in all areas of economic activity, 
but are particularly damaging for export-oriented industries where quality control and time­
liness of delivery are paramount. CoUier (1998) and Golub, Jones, and Kierzkowski (2007) 
attribute Africa’s failure to attract investment in labor-intensive manufacturing to state fail­
ures raising transactions costs. It is less well known that traditional cash crop production is 
also undermined by severe disorganization resulting from state failures.
Agricultural primary products such as cotton, coffee, cocoa, and groundnuts still domi­
nate exports of many African countries, affecting the livelihoods of very large numbers of 
people, often smallholder farmers. These products involve complex value chains, includ­
ing research and extension, provision of credit and inputs (seeds and fertilizer), storage, 
collection of the crop, transport, processing (e.g. shelling peanuts or ginning cotton), and 
marketing, in addition to planting and harvesting. Particularly for smallholders, arrange­
ments for provision of credit and repayment of loans are major issues. Consequently, as 
Poulton et al. (2004) and Tschirley et al. (2009) have documented for cotton, there is a 
fundamental trade-off between competition and coordination in the organization of the 
value chain.
Exports of specialty coffees, for example, in Rwanda, illustrate the potential gains from 
exports of agricultural commodities through technological transfer and product upgrading 
(Golub, O’Connell, and Du 2008). But more often, the same institutional obstacles to manu­
facturing competitiveness block progress in agriculture, as illustrated by the cases of cotton 
in Benin and groundnuts in The Gambia and Senegal. As in other countries, these cash crops 
were controlled by state marketing boards in the first decades of independence and privat­
ized in the 1990s and 2000s. The integrated state-controlled system was evidently flawed, 
but reforms have had mixed success. Opening the market has often entailed opportunistic 
behavior rather than open competition. Provision of public goods has suffered.
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8.5.3 Cotton in Benin
With assistance from the World Bank, in the 1990s Benin phased in a complex system of 
private organization, involving limited competition. The reforms succeeded in spurring the 
entry of domestic entrepreneurs. Some of these entrepreneurs have proved effective, while 
others have been incompetent and opportunistic, relying on political connections to reinain 
in business. The government failed to enforce the rules and sanction cheaters. Instead, it 
sometimes intervened in support of special interests and disrupted the functioning of the 
system. Benin suffers in some respects from the worst of both worlds; limited coordination, 
due to the weakness of the institutions in enforcing compliance, and limited competition, 
resulting in depressed production and incomes. The problem is not so much the design o 
the reforms but the government’s inability to implement them effectively (Golub 2009).
8.5.4 Groundnuts in Senegal/The Gambia
Groundnuts remain the two countries’ dominant cash crop (Golub and Mbaye 2002; Mbaye 
2005; Integrated Framework 2007). Groundnuts can be sold in either edible form or pro­
cessed into peanut oil and oil-cake. Contrary to the view that developing countries should 
strive for greater processing rather than selling products in raw form, edible groundnuts 
can fetch much higher prices in the European market than groundnuts pressed into oil. 
However, concerns about aflatoxins^ and pesticide residues have ratcheted up the qual­
ity standards in the edibles market, with higher qualities commanding increasing premi­
ums. Processes for controlling aflotoxins are well-known and not difficult to implement in 
purely technical terms, requiring attention to moisture control and rapid shipment, in turn 
demanding investment in storage and transport infrastructure, and training of personnel in 
proper handling (Mbaye 2005). Senegal and The Gambia have made little or no progress in 
these areas, so Senegalese and Gambian edible groundnuts have very elevated aflotoxm lev­
els and have thus largely been shut out of the European market.
8.6 Conclusions
African economies have picked up but structural transformation remains limited. In this 
setting, employment opportunities are barely keeping up with rapidly growing labor forces. 
In low-income countries, this translates into large and sometimes growing underemploy­
ment rather than open unemployment, as people are simply too poor not to work. The vast 
majority of the work force remains in subsistence agriculture and, increasingly, the urban
7 Aflatoxins are a known cancer-causing substance that contaminates groundnuts when handling and
storage are slow and the crop is exposed to inappropriate moisture and temperature.
* Gambian raw groundnuts have been sold at discounted prices for birdseed, but even this limi e 
market is threatened as animal rights activists protest against exposure of birds to high levels of 
aflotoxins!
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informal sector, with very low and uncertain incomes and no access to social insurance pro­
grams. Public sector jobs have dwindled since the era of structural adjustment in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and private formal sector employment growth has been too small and started 
from too low a base to make a significant dent in underemployment. With its rapidly grow­
ing populations, small enclaves of relatively well-paying modern sectors, and vast informal 
economies, Africa resembles the situation described by Arthur Lewis (1954) as “unlimited 
supply of labor” more so today than at the time Lewis presented his classic analysis.
Lewis’s (1954) depiction of development as the absorption of underemployed labor from 
subsistence activities into modern industry is still valid, with two amendments. First, devel­
oping countries can harness the forces of globalization to generate unprecedentedly rapid 
growth through labor-intensive exports, as successive waves of East Asian countries have 
been demonstrating for 50 years. Second, exports of traditional and non-traditional agricul­
tural crops, tourism, and fishing are viable alternatives to manufacturing in Africa. Africa 
has opportunities to benefit from globalization, in manufacturing but even more in agri­
culture. When the government fails to provide public goods and harasses formal-sector 
firms, domestic enterprises will shut down or become informal, and foreign investors will 
look elsewhere. The work force pays the price in the form of fewer employment opportuni­
ties and lower incomes. Many African countries have made considerable progress in restor­
ing macroeconomic stability and improving the business environment, but further efforts 
are needed to attain global competitiveness in labor-intensive industries to spur sustained 
employment growth and rising earnings.
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